A quantum cryptography implementation is presented that uses entanglement to combine one-way operation with an autocompensating feature that has hitherto only been available in implementations that require the signal to make a round trip between the users. Using the concept of advanced waves, it is shown that this proposed implementation is related to the round-trip implementation in the same way that Ekert's two-particle scheme is related to the original one-particle scheme of Bennett and Brassard. The practical advantages and disadvantages of the proposed implementation are discussed in the context of existing schemes.
The idea of using quantum systems for secure communications originated in the 1970s with Stephen Wiesner's intuition that the uncertainty principle, commonly derided as a source of noise, could be harnessed to detect unauthorized monitoring of a communication channel ͓1͔. The first quantum cryptographic protocol ͑BB84͒ was published by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 ͓2͔. While rigorous proofs of the security of BB84 under realistic conditions have only recently emerged ͑cf. Ref. ͓3͔ , and references therein͒, the ''no-cloning theorem'' ͓4͔ published in 1982 provides a oneline security proof applicable in ideal circumstances. Given the obvious choice of light as a signal carrier, the path to practical quantum cryptography was clear: develop robust experimental methods to create, manipulate, transmit, and detect single photons. For an excellent summary of progress in the theory and practice of quantum cryptography, see Ref.
͓5͔.
The nascent field of quantum cryptography took an unexpected turn in 1992 when Ekert published a new protocol ͓6͔ that derived its security from the violation of Bell's inequality ͓7͔. The practical importance of this scheme was immediately questioned by Bennett et al. ͓8͔ . They pointed out that the same hardware required for Ekert's protocol could be used to implement the more efficient BB84 protocol. This is accomplished by regarding the two-particle source together with one detection apparatus as a single entity that produces a localized quantum state ͑i.e., one of the four BB84 polarization states͒ to be detected by the other detection apparatus. Although not described as such, their objection amounted to an application of the concept of advanced waves ͓9͔. This method, pioneered by Klyshko, establishes a formal equivalence between the following two optical constructs: ͑1͒ the propagation of two entangled photons from a localized source to a pair of remote detectors and ͑2͒ the propagation of a single photon from one detector backwards towards the source, where it is reflected, and then forward to the other detector. The advanced-wave method is a powerful tool for developing intuition about two-photon interference experiments that demonstrate entanglement in time ͓10͔, space ͓11͔, and, trivially, polarization. For a discussion of apparent backward-in-time processes in the more general context of quantum information theory, see Ref.
͓12͔.
The strong interest in absolutely secure communications has fueled an ongoing effort to determine which protocol leads to the best performance in practical implementations. In 1997, Muller et al. introduced autocompensating quantum cryptography ͑AQC͒, in which the optical signal makes a round trip between the legitimate users ͑commonly referred to as Alice and Bob͒ ͓13͔. The scheme is described as autocompensating since it provides high-visibility interference without an initial calibration step or active compensation of drift in the optical apparatus; these favorable properties led the authors to refer to their scheme informally as ''plug-andplay quantum cryptography.'' While this scheme and its refinements ͓14 -18͔ represent substantial progress in the quest for a practical quantum cryptography implementation, the requirement that the signal travel both directions along the transmission line leads to nontrivial technical difficulties.
In this paper, we describe one-way entangled-photon autocompensating quantum cryptography ͑OW-AQC͒ in which two photons travel one way ͑e.g., from Alice to Bob͒, instead of one photon traveling back and forth, as in AQC. The formal association of OW-AQC with AQC follows directly from the advanced-wave view, just as Ekert's scheme follows from BB84. While Ekert's scheme employs entanglement to allow an alternative space-time configuration ͑signal source between Alice and Bob versus a source on Alice's side͒, OW-AQC employs entanglement to achieve immunity to interferometer drift within the original paradigm of a oneway quantum channel from Alice to Bob. Thus, our result provides an example of the capability afforded by quantum entanglement.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the standard AQC scheme. Second, we introduce OW-AQC and show that it combines one-way operation with the insensitivity to drift that is characteristic of its predecessor. Third, we point out the formal equivalence of the two methods from the advanced-wave viewpoint using space-time diagrams. Finally, we discuss the relative merits of OW-AQC. Figure 1͑a͒ contains a schematic of AQC. The protocol begins with Bob launching a strong pulse from a laser ͑L͒ into a Mach-Zehnder interferometer via a circulator ͑C͒. This interferometer splits the pulse into an advanced amplitude ͑P1͒ and a retarded amplitude ͑P2͒. The amplitudes travel through phase modulators ͑PM͒ on Bob's side and Alice's side, and are then attenuated ͑AT͒ to the single-photon level and reflected by Alice back to Bob. Although both P1 and P2 will again be split at Bob's Mach-Zehnder interferometer, by gating his detector appropriately, Bob can postselect those cases in which P1 takes the long path and P2 takes the short path on the return trip. Thus, the interfering amplitudes experience identical delays on their round trips, ensuring insensitivity to drift in Bob's interferometer.
The role of the phase modulators can be readily understood by examining the space-time diagram of this protocol ͓see Fig. 1͑b͔͒ . The eight boxes ͑A1-A4, B1-B4͒ refer to the phase settings on the two modulators as the two amplitudes pass through each of them twice. For example, B2 refers to the phase acquired by the delayed amplitude of the pulse that Bob sends to Alice, while B4 refers to the phase acquired by the same amplitude as it travels back from Alice to Bob. It should be understood that B1-B4 refer to the settings of the same physical phase shifter at different times ͑and similarly for A1-A4͒. The probability of a detection at Bob's detector is given by
From this expression, we see that only the relative phase between the phase modulator settings affects the probability of detection. Thus, by setting B1ϭB2 and A1ϭA2, Alice and Bob can implement the interferometric version of BB84 by encoding their cryptographic key in the difference settings ⌬ A ϵA4ϪA3 and ⌬ B ϵB4ϪB3. Since the resulting expression
is independent of the time delay in Bob's interferometer and the absolute phase settings in either modulator, Alice and Bob are able to achieve high-visibility interference without initial calibration or active compensation of drift. Figure 1͑c͒ contains a schematic of OW-AQC. Alice's source ͑S͒ produces a specific two-photon state that is transmitted to Bob and analyzed with a Mach-Zehnder interferometer and a single detector that is activated for two distinct time intervals. As in AQC, Alice and Bob change the settings of their respective phase modulators at specific time intervals in order to implement BB84. The two-photon state that Alice sends to Bob consists of an early photon ͑which is emitted from Alice's source in the time interval t e ͓Ϫ2T,0͔) and a late photon ͑which is emitted in the time interval t l ͓0,2T͔). The joint emission times of the early photon and the late photon are described by the state ͉⌿͘ ϭ͐͐dt e dt l f (t e ,t l )͉t e ͉͘t l ͘, where
This particular entangled state entails perfect anticorrelation in the time of emission of the two photons; thus, while the difference in emission times of the two photons is uniformly distributed over the interval ͓0,4T͔, the sum of the emission times is fixed at tϭ0 for each emitted pair. By Fourier duality, the two photons are correlated in frequency. While the typical configurations for practical sources of entangled photon pairs produce frequency anticorrelation, the frequencycorrelated case has been discussed in several papers ͓19-24͔. Figure 1͑d͒ presents a space-time diagram of the OW-AQC protocol. The two-photon entangled state is sent through Alice's phase modulator at position zϭz A , where she sets the phase shifts ͑A1-A4͒ for the four time intervals indicated in the diagram. Next, the two-photon state is transmitted along the channel to Bob, where it is sent through Bob's phase modulator (zϭz B ). A Mach-Zehnder interferometer (zϭz M ) then delays a portion of the radiation by a time . Finally, Bob's detector (zϭz D ) is activated for two time intervals of length T that correspond to the second halves of the early and late photon wave packets. Gating Bob's detector in this way postselects the cases in which the FIG. 1. ͑a͒ and ͑c͒ depict schematics for AQC and OW-AQC, respectively. L is a source of laser pulses, S emits the two-photon entangled state ͉⌿͘ described by Eq. ͑3͒, C is a circulator, AT is an attenuator, PM is a phase modulator, and ͑D, D e , D l ) are detectors. ͑b͒ and ͑d͒ depict the associated space-time diagrams that indicate how the interference condition between the two amplitudes is controlled by both Alice and Bob. The dotted space-time traces in ͑b͒ are used in the text to explain the relationship between the two methods from the viewpoint of advanced waves. In ͑d͒, the four rectangles at the point zϭz D correspond to the four time intervals labeled at zϭz A and zϭz B . The unshaded boxes indicate the two time intervals during which Bob's detector is activated. The solid and dashed space-time traces depict two interfering two-photon amplitudes, as described in the text.
advanced ͑delayed͒ portion of each photon takes the long ͑short͒ path. This postselection reduces the photon flux by half and obviates the need for rapid switching of optical paths. Since the time intervals are nonoverlapping, we may consider that Bob is using two detectors that are distinguished by the ordering of their respective time windows. Thus, for the rest of the paper, we refer to two detectors on Bob's side, D e and D l , which correspond, respectively, to the early and late activation intervals of Bob's single physical detector.
The two-photon interference can be seen by examining the space-time trajectories of two specific two-photon amplitudes. In Fig. 1͑d͒ , the solid space-time traces entail emission times (t e ,t l )ϭ(Ϫ3T/2,3T/2) and the dashed traces entail emission times (t e ,t l )ϭ(ϪT/2,T/2). For delay ϭT, the portion of the solid and dashed amplitudes leading to a coincidence are indistinguishable after Bob's Mach-Zehnder interferometer. This indistinguishability brings about quantum interference that varies continuously between completely constructive and completely destructive, depending on the joint phase settings A1-A4, B1-B4.
By activating detectors D e and D l for a duration T at times (z D /c)ϪT and (z D /c)ϩT, respectively, Bob establishes the following relation between the electric-field operators Ê e,l at his detectors and the annihilation operator â (t) associated with ͉t͘:
͑5͒
where is the delay in Bob's Mach-Zehnder interferometer and c is the speed of light. Substituting these relations into the expression for the probability of a coincidence P c ϰ͐͐dt 1 dt 2 ͉͗0͉Ê e (t 1 )Ê l (t 2 )͉⌿͉͘ 2 , we obtain
where ⌳(x)ϭ1Ϫ͉x͉ for Ϫ1ϽxϽ1 and 0 otherwise. When ϭT, this equation reduces to the expression for the probability of detection in AQC ͓see Eq. ͑2͔͒. To implement the interferometric version of BB84, Alice and Bob hold the settings of their respective phase modulators constant for the first two time intervals depicted in Fig. 1͑d͒ ͑i.e., A1ϭA2 and B1ϭB2), and manipulate the difference terms ⌬ A ϵA4ϪA3 and ⌬ B ϵB4ϪB3. The crucial point is that the interference condition is independent of the absolute setting or drift in either of the phase modulators. This demonstrates that OW-AQC achieves the insensitivity to absolute phase settings characteristic of AQC, while requiring only one pass through the optical system. It is instructive to compare the space-time diagrams in Figs. 1͑b͒ and 1͑d͒ . Reflecting the dotted traces in Fig. 1͑b͒ around the line tϭ0 results in the exact space-time arrangement of Fig. 1͑d͒ . This construction also provides a clear explanation of why the two-photon state described by Eq. ͑3͒ is chosen to possess frequency correlation instead of the more common frequency anticorrelation. A device that creates pairs of photons with coincident frequencies ͓S in Fig.  1͑d͔͒ is nothing more than a mirror ͓as required by Fig. 1͑b͔͒ when analyzed from the advanced-wave viewpoint. Thus, Klyshko's advanced-wave interpretation provides an intuitive justification for the equivalence between the probability of single-photon detection ͓Eq. ͑2͔͒ and the probability of two-photon coincidence ͓Eq. ͑6͔͒ with respect to the phase modulator settings A1-A4 and B1-B4.
Here we provide a qualitative comparison of AQC and OW-AQC. While AQC requires that only one photon travel the distance between Alice and Bob after Alice attenuates Bob's signal to the single-photon level, OW-AQC requires that two photons travel the same distance. Thus, the loss incurred in OW-AQC is approximately twice that of AQC for the same distance. However, the use of a strong pulse on the first leg of the round trip in AQC also contributes to a disadvantage relative to OW-AQC. Specifically, backscattered light from the strong pulse is guided directly into Bob's detectors and can lead to unacceptably high bit-error rates. Another advantage of OW-AQC is immunity from the ''Trojan horse attack'' ͓5͔, in which Eve sends an optical signal into Alice's lab and measures the state of the reflected light in order to infer the setting of Alice's phase modulator. While an optical isolator can subvert this attack in the case of OW-AQC, the bidirectional flow of optical signals in AQC prevents this defense. In AQC, the probability of detection is independent of the delay in Bob's interferometer ͓see Eq. ͑2͔͒, while in OW-AQC the interference condition is independent of , but the visibility of this interference is not ͓see Eq. ͑6͔͒. Thus, while drift in the absolute values of the phase modulations will not affect the performance of OW-AQC, drift in the optical delay must be minimized to maintain high-visibility interference.
It is important to note that OW-AQC requires the frequency-correlated two-photon entangled state described in Eq. ͑3͒. This state has been investigated theoretically ͓19͔, and several experimental methods for creating the state have been proposed ͓20-24͔. However, the state has not yet been experimentally demonstrated. While frequency-anticorrelated photon pairs are naturally generated when a monochromatic pump beam impinges on a nonlinear crystal, frequency-correlated photon pairs are only generated when a broad-band pump is used, and constraints on the phase and group velocities of the pump, signal, and idler are satisfied. These constraints can be satisfied in a collinear setup by exploiting the birefringence of the nonlinear crystal ͓20,21͔. An enhanced flexibility in satisfying these constraints can be achieved by imposing a periodic modulation of the crystal's nonlinear coefficient ͓23͔. A second approach to satisfying these constraints is to exploit the inherent symmetry of a configuration in which a nonlinear waveguide is pumped at normal incidence such that the down-converted photons are counterpropagating ͓24͔. The advantage of this method is that frequency-correlated photon pairs can be generated regardless of the dispersion characteristics of the nonlinear material.
In summary, we have described a quantum cryptography implementation that exploits quantum entanglement to achieve the favorable stability of AQC without requiring a round trip between Alice and Bob. This work demonstrates that quantum entanglement can offer practical advantages with respect to noise in quantum cryptography implementations. The next step in evaluating the promise of this approach for practical quantum cryptography involves explicit experimental proposals for creating the source described by Eq. ͑3͒ and quantitative performance analysis.
Both this work and Ekert's landmark paper ͓6͔ linking quantum cryptography and Bell's theorem describe twophoton interference effects that employ different space-time configurations to perform tasks previously achieved with single-photon interference. These constructions can be seen as applications of Klyshko's theory of advanced waves, which provides a formal equivalence of one-and two-photon interference experiments. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation; the Center for Subsurface Sensing and Imaging Systems ͑CenSSIS͒, an NSF Engineering Research Center; and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ͑DARPA͒.
